PEOPLE ON THE MOVE
Managing Migration In Today's Commonwealth

The first report of the Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development
The Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development was established in 2009 to study and make recommendations on issues concerning migration and development in Commonwealth countries. The Commission will also advise Commonwealth governments on how they might adopt mutually beneficial and practical policies to maximise the benefits of international migration.

The Commission will issue two further reports in 2011 and a final consolidated report prior to the Commonwealth Summit in Perth, Australia in October 2011. This consolidated report will set out specific opportunities for the Commonwealth, and a vision statement for migration and development in the future.

This first report has been prepared for the Commission by Dr Alan Gamlen of the International Migration Institute, Oxford, Department of International Development, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.

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PEOPLE ON THE MOVE

Managing Migration In Today’s Commonwealth
- action to re-connect historical links

Prepared by Dr. Alan Gamlen
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The wise management of international migration is one of the greatest challenges of our time, and the Commonwealth has unparalleled experience to share.

It was therefore with great pleasure that I and six distinguished colleagues accepted the invitation of the Ramphal Centre, London to undertake an inquiry as the Ramphal Commission for Development. Our aim is to advise Commonwealth leaders and governments as to how best to utilise this powerful human movement in ways which can contribute to the growth of the developing countries and also benefit those which are already developed.

This report, prepared under our direction by Dr. Alan Gamlen of the International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, who we like to thank most warmly, covers four of our ten terms of reference, including human dimensions, brain drain, the role of diasporas, and remittance flows. We envisage two other interim reports, to be followed by a consolidated report for Commonwealth leaders to consider at their meeting in Perth, Australia in October 2011.

This, our first report, covers a broad sweep. It makes a series of recommendations, which we commend to policymakers, and advocates the establishment of a Commonwealth Consultative Process. The Commonwealth, with its use of English and some 45 million people living outside their land of birth, is an important continuing arena for world migration. Our recommendations may be of interest to the wider international community also.

I would like to take the opportunity to thank those who have helped fund this work, including the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Commonwealth Foundation; the Honourable George Vassiliou, the Government of Cyprus and the Elysium Hotel, Paphos, which facilitated the meeting at which we amended and adopted this report; and volunteers at the Ramphal Centre who have helped us maintain momentum.

The Hon P J Patterson
Chairman, Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development
Former Prime Minister of Jamaica (1992-2006)
Executive Summary

Migration, along with birth and death, has always defined human populations, and today it is one of the most powerful currents shaping global society. Migrants are now more numerous than the resident populations of all but four countries in the world, and their remittances, at around US$414 billion in 2009, constitute one of the largest and fastest growing cross-border financial flows.\(^1\) Moreover, on current demographic trends, the importance of migration is set to increase markedly in the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) century.

There is renewed optimism about the relationship between migration and development. Well-managed migration is thought to support development by empowering individuals, bridging cultures, creating wealth, and balancing inequalities. Yet poorly managed migration can undermine development by making migrants vulnerable, and destabilizing origin and destination communities. Effective migration management requires cooperation among origin and destination countries and migrants. This is currently best achieved by partnerships among communities and countries directly linked to each other by migration.\(^2\)

The Commonwealth has always been linked by migration and it remains one of the world’s great migration arenas. The Commonwealth contains around 45 million international migrants – around one fifth of the global total.\(^3\) Moreover, the Commonwealth has unparalleled migration management experience to share among member states and beyond. Migration is an issue that can galvanize the energy and expertise of the Commonwealth, and demonstrate its ongoing relevance.

This report proposes that the Commonwealth should “re-connect” over the issue of migration, by implementing four key recommendations:

1) **Build migration management capacity** in Commonwealth member states and institutions, by training migration officials and improving migration data;

2) **Streamline migration policies** by simplifying regulations around mobility, mitigating brain drain, promoting brain circulation, and managing low-skilled labour migration;

3) **Help migrants to share their successes** with their origin and destination communities by facilitating remittances and engaging diasporas; and

4) **Enhance international cooperation over migration** by cooperating to protect migrants’ rights, establishing a Commonwealth Consultative Process on migration, and boosting Commonwealth participation in wider global migration governance forums.
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List of Acronyms

CARICOM – Caribbean Community
COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
EAC – East African Community
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
EU – European Union
EEC – European Economic Community
IOM – International Organization for Migration
MIDA – Migration for Development in Africa
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
RCMD – Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development
SADC – Southern African Development Community
TOKTEN – Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals
UAE – United Arab Emirates
UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN – United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA – United Nations Relief Works Agency
USA – United States of America
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Introduction

Migration, like birth and death, has always defined human populations, and today it is one of the most powerful currents shaping global society. In the past decade, the number of people living outside their birth country has risen from around 150 million to more like 214 million; the world’s migrants are now more numerous than the resident populations of all but four of the world’s countries, and comprise over three percent of all humans. In 2009 migrants sent home around US$414 billion in remittances — one of the largest and fastest growing cross-border financial flows — around three quarters of which went to developing countries. Moreover, against a background of inexorable global population aging, competition for migrant labour is set to intensify over the course of the 21st century.

If managed well, migration can bring huge benefits — empowering individuals, bridging cultures, creating wealth, and balancing inequalities. Migrants themselves can win by increasing personal freedoms and raising living standards. Destination countries can gain by increasing production and offsetting population aging. And origin countries can gain by easing unemployment as well as banking the remittances, investments and knowledge transfers of engaged emigrants. Yet, migration can also cause traumatic upheaval, uprooting people, depleting areas of origin, and abruptly transforming destination societies. For migrants themselves, migration can be a costly and risky process. For destination countries, it can lead to fears about wage competition and social dislocation. And for origin countries, there are lingering concerns about detrimental dynamics such as brain drain, “long-distance nationalism”, and the temptation to pursue remittances instead of broader development.

Maximizing the gains and minimizing the losses from migration requires coherent, cooperative management, involving migrants as well as origin and destination communities. Destination countries need to regulate immigration flows in line with labour market needs and development goals, while fostering migrant integration. Origin countries need to work to retain skilled workers and engage their expatriates in development at home. Moreover, origin and destination countries need to cooperate with each other and with international organizations to regulate middlemen, crack down on transnational crime, reduce irregular migration, and uphold human rights. Neither a system of sealed sovereign units, nor a centrally planned global migration structure, can effectively promote the necessary cooperation. Rather, migration is currently best managed through partnerships among countries and communities directly linked to each other by it.

The Commonwealth has always been linked by migration and it remains one of the world’s great migration arenas. It came into being through the population movements — both forced and free — that created the British Empire. Since the disintegration of its imperial foundations, not only shared values but also the intermingling of peoples has united the Commonwealth. Today, intra-Commonwealth migration still accounts for around half of all migration to and from Commonwealth countries. The Commonwealth contains around 45 million international migrants — around one fifth of the global total, and “over half of international migration ... takes place between countries with a common language, the lion’s share of this being between English-speaking countries.”

The linking role of migration in the Commonwealth, and the wealth of migration experience among its members, mean that migration is a key Commonwealth issue. Through long experience, the Commonwealth has evolved many systems for dealing with migration. It
contains many of the world’s classic immigration and emigration countries, and – as a former free-movement space – it embodies a wealth of experience with international cooperation on this issue. This expertise can help both member states and other global groupings to manage migration more effectively. Migration is an issue that can galvanize the energy and expertise of the Commonwealth, and demonstrate its ongoing relevance.

This Interim Report for the Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development (RCMD) covers four of the Commission’s ten Terms of Reference (see Appendix 1). It is largely based on secondary sources (listed in the endnotes), supplemented by primary data where appropriate, and it is divided into three sections. **Section 1** outlines the “forces and frictions” which cause and condition migration and the main types of flows that result. It also analyses the Commonwealth “migration system” – distinguishing a core (the United Kingdom), a semi-periphery (the former “settler” colonies), and a periphery (the former “subject” colonies). **Section 2** synopsizes state of the art thinking about migration and development, reviewing the costs and benefits of migration for migrants themselves and for destination and origin countries, as well as outlining the broad principles on which migration and development policy making should be based. The section then examines how current migration trends and policies play out across four Commonwealth case studies: Singapore, South Africa, New Zealand and Bangladesh. **Section 3**, the final section of the report, makes four sets of recommendations in line with the Commission’s Terms of Reference:

1) **Build migration management capacity**, by improving training procedures for migration experts and officials in Commonwealth countries, and improving the availability and comparability of international migration data.

2) **Streamline migration policies**, by making regulations around mobility simpler and more transparent, improving the management of emigration, and joining up migration and development policies across all levels of government. Brain drain should be mitigated by improving training in destination countries, and improving working conditions for key sectors in origin countries. Low skilled labour migration should be allowed through legal channels, but managed so as to both protect the rights and welfare of migrant workers, uphold labour standards and promote social cohesion in destination countries.

3) **Help migrants to share their successes** with their origin and destination countries, by building infrastructure and supporting bottom up initiatives to facilitate remittances, as well as encouraging and enabling diasporas to invest in, do business with, and share their skills and networks with their home countries.

4) **Improve international cooperation over migration**, by cooperating to protect human rights, establishing a Commonwealth Consultative Process on migration (modelled on the many regional consultative processes that exist in this area), and developing a stronger and more distinctive Commonwealth voice in existing global migration governance forums, where Commonwealth experiences and expertise have much to offer wider discussions.
1. International Migration and the Commonwealth

Forces and Frictions

Migration is caused and conditioned by various external and internal ‘forces’ and ‘frictions’. Early migration theories emphasized external forces. Some argued that migrants were pushed by low wages and high unemployment and pulled by high wages and low unemployment, and that migration would eventually balance these inequalities. Others countered that inequalities between rich and poor countries were the enduring structures driving migration, and that origin countries both depended on and were exploited by destination countries for their skills and labour.

More recent theories also acknowledge internal forces driving migration. For example, some depict migration as a household strategy, arrived at through complex processes of internal negotiation, rather than an automatic rational reaction. Others question rational explanations altogether, for example showing how 19th century settler movements were “influenced by poetry, dreams, and hopes” that went hand-in-hand with a “boom mentality”, or demonstrating how a “culture of migration” develops when migration becomes ingrained in expectations over time.

Forces drive migration, but frictions – including poverty, poor information, and borders – inhibit it. Those in most need cannot afford to migrate. Physical, legal and administrative barriers form thicker or thinner borders through which migrants must pass. Conversely, factors such as shared language and legal systems, efficient transportation and communication infrastructures, migration industries of agents and brokers, and transnational networks of family and friends can all reduce frictions and facilitate migration. These facilitators are the hardware and software of “migration systems,” and the Commonwealth is one of the oldest and most important of such systems.

Types of Migration

No typology of migration is universally accepted, as types of migration inevitably overlap – and in particular, as John Oucho points out, it is often difficult to distinguish “forced” and “free” migration. Nevertheless, it is analytically useful to place different combinations of migration forces and frictions along a spectrum between these two extremes. Three useful markers along the forced-free spectrum are “survival migration”, labour migration, and “life-course” migration. In keeping with its focus on skills mobility, remittances and diaspora contributions, this report is primarily focused on labour migration.

Survival Migration

Alexander Betts coins the term “survival migrants” to denote “persons outside their country of origin because of an existential threat to which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution”. Survival migration is used here over the more conventional term “forced migration” because, where the latter suggests a passive reaction to “arbitrary” external compulsions, “survival” suggests a more active process involving both external forces and internal motivations. Survival migrants may include so-called environmental migrants and people fleeing livelihood collapse, but the core categories are asylum seekers and refugees recognized under the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
In 2009, there were 983,000 asylum seekers and 15.2 million refugees (10.4 million overseen by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and 4.8 million by the United Nations Relief Works Agency). Refugees comprise just 7.6% of all migrants globally but about 10% of all migrants in the Commonwealth (4.2 million); most are in developing countries, including Pakistan, home to the world’s largest refugee population (1.7 million). Refugees who make it to industrialized countries are often “guided” by historical ties like those of the Commonwealth, which, for example, lead asylum seekers from Africa and Sri Lanka to the United Kingdom.

Life-course Migration

At the opposite end of the forced-free spectrum lies what is sometimes called “life-course” migration. “Life-course migration” is used here over the better-known term “lifestyle migration”; both suggest relatively ‘frictionless’ voluntary movement, but where the latter is driven by arguably nebulous “quality of life” factors, the former is driven by definable life “transitions”, including leaving the parents’ home, marrying and retiring.

Transitions around leaving home and completing education underlie the British Gap Year, and its slightly later, longer and more career-focused Antipodean variant, the “Overseas Experience”, which are major migration flows linking the United Kingdom and its former “settler” colonies. Typically some 30,000 successful UK university applicants defer study for a year; many to go on Gap Year trips to the antipodes and elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Such flows are facilitated by networks of visa waiver and working holiday agreements, which permit young people to travel and work in each other’s countries for limited periods.

Transitions around marriage and family formation are major drivers of family reunification migration, where labour migrants sponsor dependent family members. All former settler colonies of the Commonwealth maintain family reunification visa channels, which remain dominated by women. In 2008, 16% of all immigrants and 27% of all female immigrants to the UK were “accompanying or joining another person”. Like other forms of life-course migration, family reunification overlaps with economic migration, as decisions to work abroad are made by households rather than individuals, and “dependants” often work.

The transition to retirement is another important driver of global and intra-Commonwealth migration flows. Retirees often migrate for better weather, a more relaxed rural lifestyle, lower living costs, or proximity of living family or cultural ‘roots’. Significant flows of retirees still follow the pathways among the developed countries of the Commonwealth, facilitated by family reunification laws and pension portability provisions.

Labour Migration

Between the two extremes of survival and life-course migration lies labour migration, the main focus of this report. Labour migration is defined here as voluntary movement for employment, but as the International Organization for Migration notes, “there is no universally accepted definition”. There were some 86 million migrant workers in 2005; equivalent to about 3% of the global labour force. Since the 1990s, most industrialized countries have experienced increasing temporary labour migration, driven by factors such as population aging, where higher old-age dependency ratios is boosting demand for key services such as health and domestic care.
Labour migrants are increasingly subdivided by nominal skill level. Low skilled labour migrants are more numerous; in developed countries they gravitate to “construction, commerce, catering, education, health care, domestic and other services”, whereas in less developed countries (where they mostly end up), they cluster in primary sectors such as agriculture, fishing, mining, manufacturing and tourism.  

As Bela Hovy notes, Commonwealth highly skilled emigration rates range from up to 70% in some small island developing states, to less than 5%, for example in larger and more developed countries. Developed Commonwealth countries exchange many highly skilled migrants: Commonwealth countries supplied over half of all university educated migrants in Australia, one third in Canada, two thirds in New Zealand, and nearly half in the United Kingdom. A related flow, student migration, is now a major source of skilled immigrants and higher education revenues in destination countries. For example, in the year to June 2010, students accounted for more than half of all entry visas granted to the United Kingdom.

**Cross-cutting Themes**

Gender, irregular migration and transnationalism are themes running through all types of migration.

Women move differently from men, for example, more often as wives and dependents, and less often on economic and humanitarian grounds. Females were once thought to be more mobile than males over short distances within countries, but less mobile internationally. This has changed in modern times: females were 49% of all migrants in 2010, and also 49% of all Commonwealth migrants.

Some migration of all types flows through irregular channels, defined as extra-legal entry or residence. Reliable statistics are virtually impossible to obtain, but estimates suggest that 10-15% of all migration stocks and flows are irregular. Like regular migration, irregular migration often follows historical or linguistic pathways, causing concern in various Commonwealth countries.

Transnationalism, defined as “multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states,” is also a feature of all migration types. Although not new, transnationalism is now unprecedentedly fast, intense and widespread, linked by technologies including email, mobile phones, social networking websites, mobile banking and satellite media. Economic transnationalism includes remittances, philanthropy and entrepreneurial activities. Political transnationalism involves activities such as expatriate voting and lobbying, but also wider issues of dual citizenship. Socio-cultural transnationalism involves so-called “social remittances”: “the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities.” The Commonwealth, with its long internal migration history, is linked by many diasporas and transnational communities.
The Commonwealth Migration System

Today, the Commonwealth contains around 45 million international migrants. Some 43% are concentrated in just five developed countries (Australia, Canada, Malta, New Zealand and the United Kingdom). About 35% of Commonwealth migrants are in Asia, while 21% are in Africa, 16% in North America, 15% in Europe, 13% in Oceania, and 1% in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The modern Commonwealth bears the imprint of what was once a single “world system”: the now-defunct British Empire. Movement was relatively frictionless among the British core of this system and its semi-peripheral white “settler” colonies. Movement among and from the non-white “subject” colonies (to use James Belich’s distinction) was more often controlled or coerced as part of colonial extraction. Although it is now essentially symbolic to say that Commonwealth countries “are not foreign to each other”, similar patterns of population movement, to a significant extent, still persist today.

Britain

Britain’s migration history is one of explosion and implosion. Nineteenth century Britain unleashed settler flows unparalleled in human history, but after World War II, the United Kingdom exerted a pull so strong that London has become “the world in one city.”

Figure 1: United Kingdom migration to and from the Commonwealth

Emigration, not immigration was the main concern of British migration policy until World War II. Laissez faire attitudes prevailed until World War I, after which voluntary and assisted emigration was institutionalized through the Empire Settlement Act. Immigration was nominally free from the Commonwealth, but it was practically impossible for most people in “subject” colonies, owing to poverty and lack of information. In fact, free intra-Commonwealth movement was intended as a privilege for white British settlers.

Decolonization compelled the United Kingdom to gradually formalize its immigration policy. Forced to either cement a racist de facto policy or officially maintain open borders, United Kingdom governments chose the latter, hoping to save the empire and to discourage non-white immigration by pressuring origin states. However, as the rise of mass air travel made migration a realistic possibility for more people, this approach proved increasingly
ineffective. “By 1965 the United Kingdom had taken an estimated 800,000 immigrants from the new Commonwealth.”

Subsequently, the United Kingdom switched from free migration with the Commonwealth to free migration with Europe, without developing a sensitive mechanism for managing migration in the interim. This switch is reflected in Britain’s post-World War II migration patterns (see Figure 1), which were dominated by Commonwealth flows until around the time that Britain joined the European Economic Community in 1973, and by non-Commonwealth flows thereafter. Although it has adopted a points-based immigration system modelled on those of former “settler” colonies, the United Kingdom nevertheless now has limited capacity to regulate immigration flows, a substantial portion of which come through two essentially open channels: intra-European free movement, and family reunification. Emigration has also become a salient issue once again.

The Former “Settler” Colonies

The former “settler” colonies have experienced Britain’s explosion and implosion second-hand. They were formed from Britain’s ‘Big Bang’, and until World War II remained “classic immigration” countries, relying on constant inflows and developing sophisticated legal and administrative systems to process them.

Figure 2: Commonwealth immigration to former “settler” colonies


Strong traces of intra-Commonwealth mobility remain visible in the migration systems of former “settler” colonies, for example in the form of visa waiver programmes, working
holiday schemes, bilateral social security and double taxation treaties, and smooth paths to permanent residence and citizenship. Such ties remain particularly strong among the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and strongest in the trans-Tasman Free Travel arrangement between the latter pair. These countries still trade large proportions of their migrants with each other (see Figure 2) and with other Commonwealth countries. Though the United States of America is not a Commonwealth country itself it was also once a “settler” colony of Britain, and a fifth of all its foreign permanent residents were born in the Commonwealth.

By global standards, migrants are still a high proportion of all inhabitants in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, but dynamics have changed. The “settler” colonies (particularly the latter two) officially preferred ‘white’ immigrants until well after World War II, but with decolonization they dropped these preferences, leading to diversification. In the same period, they began to develop their own outflows and transit flows. For example, migration through New Zealand to Australia became a bilateral issue, and all the Commonwealth immigration countries began debating how to cope with emigration and diasporas.

The Former “Subject” Colonies

Britain’s former “subject” colonies in the Caribbean, Asia Pacific, South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa, have had radically different historical experiences of migration. Though they resisted domination when and how they could, their movements have always been more coerced and controlled as part of colonial extraction, through slavery, indentured labour, and modern contract labour migration.

The trans-Atlantic slave trade peaked in the 18th century, as part of the colonial plantation system of producing large-scale cash crops in the colonies, for import to Britain. Slaves were captured mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa and sold onwards through entrepôts across the empire. Around six million Africans were exported as slaves in the 18th century (see Figure 3). Slavery was replaced by the indenture system, run by local recruiters and colonial agents who often tricked or trafficked workers into low skilled jobs abroad in slave-like conditions.

Figure 3: Slaves exported from Africa as part of the trans-Atlantic trade

Although such movements are no longer so framed by the Commonwealth, and some former “subject” colonies have broken that mould to become destination societies in their own right, these patterns persist somewhat in the modern contract labour system. Contract labour is typically regulated by international agreements, which restrict migrants’ use of basic services such as housing, healthcare and social insurance and link residence permission to fixed term contracts with specified employers. Workers are often swindled or coerced into virtual debt bondage by recruiters, smugglers or traffickers. After arrival, they typically rely on rolling contracts, and remain in the precarious position of “denizenship”, or semi-permanent residence without rights.

Colonial patterns of ‘extraction’ also arguably still persist. Former “subject” colonies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean, have recently been experiencing “brain drains”, as skilled workers in key sectors such as teaching and health care seek broader horizons and better pay and working conditions, and destination countries see this as an opportunity to cut domestic training costs by recruiting from abroad. “Brain waste” can also be a problem, particularly when the foreign credentials of immigrants or returnees are not recognized, or their skills do not readily find applications.

An Enduring Pattern

First glances might suggest that Commonwealth migration is declining in importance. International migrants represent 2 percent of the Commonwealth population compared to 3.1 of the global population. Stocks have been proportionally declining in developing Commonwealth countries, and growing less quickly in developed Commonwealth countries. For an increasing number of member countries, migration is framed less by the Commonwealth and more by regional configurations, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the European Union (EU), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Trans-Tasman Free Travel Arrangement.

However, such trends belie the profound and enduring influence that the Commonwealth continues to exert on global migration patterns. First, the Commonwealth contains a full fifth of all international migrants. In developing Commonwealth countries, the migrant stock is growing faster than at any time since the 1980s: in 2005-2010 it grew at 1.7% per annum, compared with 0.2% in 2000-2005. In developed Commonwealth countries, migrants have risen from one-in-eight to one-in-six people in just twenty years. Second, intra-Commonwealth migration still accounts for about half of all Commonwealth migration. In 2000, the average (mean) Commonwealth country had sent 52% of its emigrants to, and received 49% of its immigrants from, other Commonwealth countries (See Appendix 2). More than half of all migrants live in a country that shares their native language, and for most of these people, that language is English. Indeed, many of the geopolitical groupings just mentioned are fused from fragments of what was once a unitary Commonwealth space.
Moreover, the importance of migration is projected to increase over the 21st century, driven by demographic and environmental trends that apply in the Commonwealth as much – and often more – than elsewhere. First, Commonwealth populations are aging at the same rapid rate as the rest of the world, leading to increased competition for migrant labour – a process projected to peak in the next half century (see Figure 4). In large developed countries, immigration may slow the aging process as younger immigrants with more children improve old-age dependency ratios. However, emigration of working-age young people – some of whom will be replaced by immigrant retirees and/or older returnees – may exacerbate population aging in small developing countries.  

Second, environmental factors prevalent in many parts of the Commonwealth are likely play an increasing role in causing and conditioning migration over the 21st century – as a future Ramphal Commission report will explore. For example, projected sea-level rises are a serious concern for the Commonwealth’s many small island developing states, while coastal flooding and disruption of monsoon and other climate cycles are major issues for the Commonwealth’s South Asian countries, particularly low-lying delta regions such as Bangladesh. Commonwealth leaders are certain to be managing migration for many more years to come. Their challenge will be to minimize its costs and maximize its benefits for development.
2. The New Migration and Development Optimism

An Ongoing Debate

There has long been agreement that development and migration are fundamentally linked, but as Hein de Haas puts it, the debate about whether or not the link is positive has swung “like a pendulum” between optimism and pessimism. Optimism first emerged in the 1950s and 1960s during a long economic expansion, when migration was seen as a mechanism for achieving “balanced growth” by restoring the equilibrium between labour-rich-but-capital-poor origin areas and oppositely endowed destination regions. Migration lowered wages and raised production in destination areas, while it raised wages and stimulated technological innovation in origin regions.

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<th>The Old Optimism</th>
<th>Neoclassical Economic Theories</th>
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<td>1950s-1960s</td>
<td>• Push-pull drivers (labour shortages and unemployment)</td>
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<td>• Migration balances wages, redistributes income and spurs innovation</td>
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<td>• Migrants as rational profit-maximizing individuals</td>
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Modernization and Development Theory
• Development is led by states; developing countries follow developed country trajectories
• Migration leads to return, remittances, transfer of technology

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<td>• Developed core countries exploit peripheral developing countries</td>
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<td>• Vicious cycle of “brain drain” and “brawn drain”, dependence on wastefully consumed remittances, inequality, and more outmigration</td>
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<th>The New Optimism</th>
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<td>1990s-2000s</td>
<td>• Developed societies are more, not less, mobile, and increased development will lead to more emigration in the short-run</td>
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The “New Economics of Labour Migration”
• Households spread risk by sending migrants abroad
• Migrants send remittances, with multiplier effects, stimulating economic growth
• Migrants as development agents

Theories of Transnationalism and Diaspora
• Migrants remain involved in societies of origin
• Remittances, diaspora knowledge networks, and circular migration all contribute to “brain gain”, increased trade and economic growth

This migration boom gave way to migration bust with economic crises of the 1970s, leading to migration and development pessimism. Rather than balanced growth, the impact of
Emigration was now perceived to be “asymmetric development which increases the inequality between emigration and immigration countries.” Rich destination countries would cherry pick skills and siphon off the labour of poorer origin countries, causing both “brain drains” and “brawn drains”. Meanwhile, remittances would be wasted on “conspicuous consumption”, which would fuel inflation and exacerbate inequalities rather than stimulating production.

Since the 1990s, against the background of another migration boom, optimism has resurfaced. By compensating for weak credit and insurance markets, by the multiplier effects of remittances, and by sharing of migrant know-how and labour among regions through “circular” or “cyclical” flows, migration is thought to represent a grand bargain among origin and destination countries and migrants themselves. The following section outlines the main contours of this new migration and development optimism.

**Current Thinking**

There are two ideas at the core of the new migration and development optimism. One is the idea that well-managed migration generally supports development, while unmanaged or poorly managed migration can undermine it. The other idea is that managing migration well entails neither unfettered interstate competition, nor centrally planned global migration governance, but mutually self-interested cooperation among origin and destination countries and migrants.

**Migrants**

Current consensus holds that migration is intrinsically ‘good’ for migrants, and also good for their material well-being. As the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) points out, according to Amartya Sen’s notion of “development as freedom,” freedom of movement is both intrinsic to development, and also associated with striking welfare gains. For example, the UNDP shows that “migrants from the poorest countries, on average, experienced a 15-fold increase in income, a doubling of school enrolment rates and a 16-fold reduction in child mortality after moving to a developed country.”

Yet, as the UNDP also notes, not all migrants are successful, owing to “barriers” including involuntary compulsions, excessive costs, repressive policies, and exploitative agents and employers. Ensuring that individual migrants ‘win’ from migration requires streamlining migration controls in destination countries, whilst bolstering national and international mechanisms for protecting migrants’ rights.

**Destination Countries**

Destination countries also benefit from migration. Highly skilled migrants bring new ideas and technologies, and contribute more than they consume in taxes. Low skilled migrants take jobs that native workers disdain, keeping wages low and combating inflation at the same time as raising overall production. Moreover, migration can sometimes offset population aging, and stimulate trade between destination and origin countries.

However, immigration is often politically fraught. If recruiting highly skilled immigrants is a way of cutting training costs, these costs are foisted onto origin countries. If unregulated recruitment agents supply immigrants to undercut wage levels, native workers may face
unemployment or deteriorating conditions – provoking protectionist sentiments such as “British Jobs for British Workers”. Similarly, migration can stir up fears of ethnic divisions undermining “social cohesion”. While some of these fears are alarmist, experts still debate whether migrants’ transnational identities and activities impede or assist their integration.

The policy challenges for destination countries are to open legal channels for migration but manage them in line with labour market needs and development aid goals; to cooperate with origin countries to regulate recruitment agents and uphold labour standards; to provide paths to settlement and social mobility; and to foster migrant integration through support for civil society groups working with migrants.

**Origin Countries**

The most striking aspect of the new migration and development optimism is the shift back towards optimistic thinking about the impacts of emigration on origin countries. Transnational flows of financial and social remittances and investments are considered the key mechanisms for benefiting origin countries.

Remittances are now one of the largest, fastest-growing global financial flows. Financial remittances to low- and middle-income countries “amounted to $316 billion in 2009, down from $336 billion in 2008, the highest value ever recorded.” With economic recovery, remittances are expected to rise “by 6.2 percent in 2010 and 7.1 percent in 2011”. In 2008, six Commonwealth countries were in the top 20 remittance receivers by percentage of gross domestic product (Tonga, Lesotho, Samoa, Guyana, Jamaica, and Bangladesh), and in 2009, five Commonwealth countries were estimated among the top twenty recipients of remittances in absolute terms (India, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Kingdom)(see Appendix 2).

Fears about the detrimental impacts of remittances have eased. Where once remittances were thought to fuel wasteful consumption, exacerbate inequalities, fund violent conflict, and diminish over time, most studies now take a positive view. Remittances have indirect “multiplier effects”: consumption creates demand for local products, which fuels growth. They contribute to savings and asset accumulation more than previously thought, and decay over time less than previously thought. Their impacts on inequality are expected to gradually diminish as more households become involved in migration. Illicit uses can be contained by making formal channels more attractive. Remittances are relatively stable during crises, and can help to improve developing countries’ credit ratings. Beyond remittances (as Kathleen Newland puts it) are the investments, the business start-ups, and the charitable donations made by diaspora networks to their homelands, as well as the increasing bilateral trade and “roots tourism” they can stimulate.

Social, cultural and political “remittances” are also viewed in an increasingly optimistic light. They may transmit cosmopolitan styles of cuisine, clothing, music and art back into their home culture. They may help women and girls at home to challenge tightly prescribed gender roles. They may help to democratize their homeland and raise its profile in foreign affairs – as has been the case in Ghana and other parts of Commonwealth Africa. Skilled migrants may transfer back knowledge in the form of new agricultural technologies, or scientific insights from centres of scientific excellence in their destination country, through temporary consultancies or “virtual collaborations”. Market shapers
and opinion makers in the diaspora can lend credibility to compatriots entering new markets.\textsuperscript{153} For example, non-resident Indians have been key to India’s booming technology industry.\textsuperscript{154}

New theories, better data, and more sophisticated analysis has led to more nuanced assessments of “brain drain” and “brain gain”; some highly skilled emigration can apparently stimulate educational enrolments at home, raising overall human capital levels.\textsuperscript{155} Similarly, “replacement migration”\textsuperscript{156} can lead to “brain exchange”,\textsuperscript{157} where large numbers of emigrants are “replaced” by slightly larger numbers of immigrants with similar or better skill levels (although this involves unknown churning costs).\textsuperscript{158} Increasing ease of global mobility can also lead to “brain circulation”, whereby migrants share their skills and knowledge among origin, destination and transit regions.\textsuperscript{159}

\textbf{Caveats}

Enthusiasm aside, there is universal recognition that emigration, remittances and transnational engagements cannot substitute for proper development strategies.\textsuperscript{160} First, remittances cannot take hold without an infrastructure conducive to investment.\textsuperscript{161} As Alejandro Portes puts it, “Governments must meet their half of the bargain because, in the absence of suitable conditions that only they can create, the best-intentioned transnational projects cannot succeed.”\textsuperscript{162} Second, there are lingering concerns about certain kinds of socio-cultural and political remittances, such as “long-distance nationalism”,\textsuperscript{163} which may reinforce authoritarian structures in the home country.

Third, “brain drain” is still a reality for countries with high rates of tertiary education and professional emigration. For example, a recent study of 40 developing countries shows that 28 Commonwealth member countries experience negative brain drains. The 15 worst-hit countries of the 40 studied were \textit{all} in the Commonwealth (see Appendix 2).\textsuperscript{164} Finally, promoting emigration for remittances as a development strategy may remove the impetus for painful but necessary changes at home,\textsuperscript{165} and deprive developing countries of opportunities to attract capital to labour rather than sending labour to capital.\textsuperscript{166} In all, it oversimplifies matters to expect that “emigration and remittances would be a panacea for development.”\textsuperscript{167}

Thus, origin countries face a range of policy challenges. Without restricting freedom of exit, they should work to retain skills by improving working conditions in key sectors such as health and education, and also ameliorate social costs. They should ensure emigrants – particularly those going into vulnerable low-skill industries – are well prepared. They should also cooperate with destination countries to regulate recruitment agents so as to protect migrants and uphold labour standards, and they should share the responsibility of integrating migrants in their destination countries. And at the same time, they should facilitate remittances and engage with skilled, affluent and influential diaspora networks.
**Commonwealth Cases**

This section briefly examines four contemporary ‘hotspots’ of migration in the Commonwealth: Singapore, South Africa, New Zealand and Bangladesh. The cases are presented neither as showcase models nor as cautionary tales, but are rather intended to highlight particularly complex and relevant migration issues. In keeping with the Terms of Reference covered by this report (see Appendix 1), these cases focus primarily on labour migration and inevitably omit discussion of many important other topics. The case studies do not make any claims of comprehensiveness whatsoever.

1. Polarized Migration in Singapore

Once part of the “subject” colony of British Malaya, Singapore is now arguably more comparable to immigration societies like Australia. As Brenda Yeoh shows, since independence in 1965, the tiny, densely populated and highly developed city-state has relied on immigration to overcome low fertility and lack of natural resources. Its strategy of competing as a “global city” involves a now-widespread two-tiered approach to migration management: attracting the highly skilled, and “circulating” the low skilled.

Singapore’s foreign population has grown steadily for thirty years, and in 2010, “non-residents” – defined as “foreigners who were working, studying or living in Singapore but not granted permanent residence, excluding tourists and short-term visitors” – comprised over a quarter of people captured in the census (see Figure 5). There were over a million foreign workers in Singapore in 2010 – over a third of all workers. At the end of 2009, some 856,000 of these were work-permit holders and 196,000 were domestic workers. Most foreign-born “residents” were from Malaysia, China, and South Asia, with a significant number from elsewhere in Asia, and a few from the USA, Canada, Australia, and European countries (see Figure 6). Singapore retains its traditional ethnic distinction among Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others, but the “Other” category has grown rapidly from 40,584 in 2000, to 125,754 in 2010.

**Figure 5: “Non-residents” in Singapore, 1980-2010**

![Graph showing non-residents in Singapore, 1980-2010](src_data: Singapore Department of Statistics, Time Series on Population (Mid-Year Estimates))
Yeoh highlights how Singapore relies on low skilled migrant workers in low-wage sectors including construction, domestic work, manufacturing, and the marine industries. \(^{174}\)

Employers are allocated industry-specific quotas of foreign workers, and must pay a foreign worker levy for each. \(^{175}\) (Levies have recently been raised so as to encourage investment in productivity growth as an alternative to hiring migrants. \(^{176}\)) Low skilled workers have restricted rights: \(^{177}\) they may not bring spouses or children, their permission to reside is tied to fixed-term employment contracts, they must not cohabit with or marry citizens or permanent residents of Singapore, \(^{178}\) and they must return ‘home’ if found pregnant by regular medical examinations. \(^{179}\)

By contrast, Singapore actively welcomes highly skilled migrants for “professional, managerial, executive or specialist jobs”. \(^{180}\) Marketing campaigns brand Singapore as a “Talent Capital”, buzzing with ideas and home to a vibrant cosmopolitan cultural environment. \(^{181}\) College-educated foreigners and Singaporeans are wooed with relatively generous visa privileges, including ability to switch employers, bring dependants and follow a path to permanent residence and citizenship. \(^{182}\) In 2009, some 60,000 permanent residents were admitted, and 20,000 became Singaporean citizens. \(^{183}\)

Living and working conditions in Singapore are thus increasingly polarized – or to use Yeoh’s term, “bifurcated” – by skill level. \(^{184}\) Singapore’s “guest-worker rotation” policy \(^{185}\) has been criticized for treating low skilled workers as a “revolving reserve army of labour” \(^{186}\) for employers to “use and discard”. \(^{187}\) Contract workers often borrow money to meet the costs of migration, and with entitlements they can be highly vulnerable to economic downturns, illnesses, emergencies, and exploitation by employers. \(^{188}\) But this ‘flexibility’ in the labour market is a further selling point for the “Talent Capital”: a place of “harmonious labour relations” that has been “strike-free since 1978.” \(^{189}\)
2. Brain Drain and Xenophobia in the New South Africa

Burdened by a legacy of colonialism and apartheid, South Africa has struggled to achieve a coherent approach to migration management, and this has contributed to a widespread sense of migration crisis. Two key issues have been fears of brain drain, and xenophobia towards regular and irregular migrants.

Since the late 1980s, South Africa has experienced large-scale highly skilled emigration. Between 1989 and 1997, around 233,000 South Africans emigrated to the other former “settler” colonies and the USA. Many were white and tertiary educated, although not all were fleeing the political changes, and the so-called “black brain drain” is an increasingly salient topic of concern. There are conflicting views on the impacts of these outflows. For example, “South Africa says it has spent [US]$1 billion educating health workers who have emigrated.” However, other recent research suggests that South Africa is gaining from skilled immigration at the regional level within the Southern African Development Community, even as it loses skilled emigrants to the Global North. Another study suggests that, by stimulating higher enrolments, skilled emigration from South Africa may be having a slightly positive net effect on the proportion of skills in the labour market.

Figure 7: South African-born health workers in eight major destination countries, 2001

![Figure 7](image)


Whatever the impact, highly skilled emigration, particularly of teachers and health workers, is an issue of ongoing importance and debate (see Figure 7). Meanwhile, attitudes towards highly skilled emigrants are often ambivalent: on one hand, their skills are ostensibly welcomed, and there have been prominent efforts to engage and attract them back, for example through initiatives such as SANSA (South African Network of Skills Abroad), and the Homecoming Revolution. On the other hand, they are sometimes viewed with suspicion as deserters and potential apartheid sympathizers.

Although there have been southern African regional efforts at cooperative migration management, with varying success levels, South Africa itself has yet to implement a coherent overall approach towards migration. Lack of technical capacity is a significant
issue: “Immigration officials have lacked the professional capacity to understand their task, or fulfil their basic duties”, and reliable data on South African migration is scarce. Another problem is political and bureaucratic fragmentation: Darshan Vigneswaran notes, “no single Government agency is in charge of migration”. According to Tara Polzer, the approach to migration is characterized by “fragmentation and political silence”.

Figure 8: Asylum seekers and refugees in South Africa, by source country (cumulative, end of 2006)

This is explained partly by historical divisions. As Aurelia Wa Kabwe-Segatti shows, the post-apartheid regime inherited an ad hoc apartheid-era policy toolkit, and was thus ill equipped to manage rapidly changing migration flows. Apartheid-era migration controls mirrored the colonial system of free white-settler movements and harsh control of low-paid black migrant workers. Since the transition, neoliberals and interventionists have been unable to agree on a common overall approach to policy reform, and so heavy-handed, police-led enforcement has often become the default method of managing migration.

The “fragmentation and political silence” surrounding migration contributes to a sense of crisis in some circles. Lack of managed legal channels has driven low skilled labour migration through irregular paths. Owing to huge backlogs of asylum applications (see Figure 8), asylum migration has become one of these “backdoors” into the South African labour market. Irregularity has allowed exploitation and abuse of migrants, and competition with low skilled native workers where unemployment is chronically high. There have been xenophobic backlashes involving attacks and crackdowns on migrants, particularly in very deprived areas. These partly reflect dissatisfaction with public service provision and job losses, but also more widespread and deeper-seated anti-immigrant sentiments. As Jonathan Crush warned in 2000, years before the xenophobic violence of 2008, “intolerance is extremely pervasive and growing in intensity and seriousness.”

3. New Zealand’s Diaspora

New Zealand has always been seen as a “classical country of immigration”, but since its economic separation from Britain in 1973 it has also experienced waves of large-scale emigration (see Figure 9), and now a quarter of all skilled New Zealanders live abroad.
In the average year from 1979 to 2009, 44,812 New Zealand citizens emigrated, but only 23,476 returned. Most New Zealanders abroad are dispersed across “settler”-Commonwealth or other “Anglo-world” regions (see Figure 10). Despite its excellent immigration data, New Zealand – like all countries – lacks reliable diaspora data. Different ways of measuring the diaspora give quite different impressions: if counting New Zealand-born people living abroad, then Australia is easily the most important region. But if more interested in self-identification with New Zealand, the United Kingdom looks more important (see Figure 10).

Figure 9: New Zealand net migration, 1860-2009

Figure 10: Location of New Zealand expatriates

Earlier this decade and even stretching back to the 1980s, “brain drain” became a fixture of New Zealand public debates covering not only highly skilled emigration to North America, the United Kingdom and elsewhere, but also mixed-skill flows across the open border with Australia. Under heavy public pressure to act, successive New Zealand governments have
argued that the country is experiencing “brain exchange”, whereby emigrants are “replaced” by immigrants with equal or higher skills. But there are ongoing concerns about transaction costs, and mass emigration remains high on the list of public anxieties. In 2007, current Prime Minister John Key (then Opposition Leader) insisted, “We’ve got a very, very significant brain drain issue and it’s one that the Government in a large part has been in denial over.”

There have been prominent but piecemeal efforts to engage New Zealand’s highly skilled emigrants. A marketing campaign to stimulate return, while innovative, proved ineffective and was eventually scrapped. Ad hoc diaspora engagement efforts have continued, primarily through a public-private partnership called Kea New Zealand (short for Kiwi Expats Association), whose “ultimate goal” is for “New Zealand to think, act, and engage more globally by utilising our offshore population of expatriates and honorary citizens.” It maintains a searchable online database of expatriates, and a network of regional “chapters” in key global locations, often in partnership with chambers of commerce, which organize New Zealand-themed business-networking and other events.

New Zealand has taken less interest in its low skilled emigrants, most of whom have moved to neighbouring Australia under the Trans-Tasman Free Travel Arrangement of 1973. New Zealanders’ welfare entitlements in Australia became contentious during the 1980s and 1990s, and were eventually withdrawn in 2001. New Zealanders were still enabled and encouraged to continue moving freely to Australia as part of “Closer Economic Relations”, but unbeknownst to many of them, they now had to do so without a social safety net. While some expatriates have welcomed the end of ‘Bondi Beach Dole Bludger’ stereotypes, New Zealand Government missions in Australia are still regularly approached by crisis-stricken migrants who arrived uninformed about their lack of entitlements. There are some indications that New Zealand’s indigenous Māori emigrants may be worst affected.

4. Labour Export for Development in Bangladesh

Though prefigured by colonial indentured labour, modern low skilled labour export from Bangladesh took off in the early 1970s, as rising Gulf oil states, and later industrializing Southeast Asian economies, drew in large numbers of migrant workers. As Tasneem Siddiqui shows, emigration has become a defining characteristic of Bangladeshi society, economy and government.

Officially recorded labour emigration skyrocketed from just under 300,000 in 2005 to almost 900,000 in 2008, and now more than five million Bangladeshis work abroad. Between 1976 and 2009, more than 80% of all labour export went to Gulf states; Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates together accounted for almost two thirds (see Figure 11). Professionals accounted for only 3% of the total in 1976-2009; the “less-skilled” comprised 50%. Rural males predominated, reflecting restrictions on female emigration since the early 1980s. The bulk of labour export involves low skilled rural young people emigrating with the help of recruitment agents, for two-year contracts in industries such as construction, garment production, domestic help, and nursing.
Bangladesh is one of the world’s poorest countries, and emigration performs vital and transformative functions at all levels of economy and society. Rural families are being transformed through “nucleation”, female social mobility, and changing male intergenerational dynamics. Local inequalities are increasing where migration and remittances allow better-off farms to adopt modern productivity-enhancing technology. Officially recorded remittances (see Figure 12), though they shot up to some US$10.7 billion in 2009 (11% of GDP), are thought to represent less than half of total remittances, most of which go through the informal *hundi* system, which is often cheaper, faster, more confidential and less bureaucratic. Thus, emigration is not only a prevalent micro-scale livelihood strategy, but also a macro-scale unemployment safety valve and source of foreign currency.

However, for migrants, labour export is often fraught. Recruiters often charge exorbitant fees for non-existent jobs; employers often pass on government levies to migrants.
themselves. Bangladeshis mostly work in countries that have not ratified UN migrants’ rights conventions; gender discrimination is widespread, and migrants are unable to form associations or unions.

Siddiqui also shows that emigration is managed by a range of government institutions. In 1976 the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training was established to deal with labour export. A 1982 Ordinance on Emigration regulates emigration and recruitment, through a code of conduct with revocable recruitment licenses and sanctions for migrants who violate foreign contracts. A Welfare Fund, formed from emigrant subscriptions, was established in 1990 to fund pre-departure briefings and language training as well as a welfare desk at the airport. Since 2001 a Ministry of Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment has also helped to market Bangladeshi labour abroad. There have also been a number of recent initiatives to engage skilled, affluent and influential Bangladeshi expatriates, including several investment conferences focusing on the United Kingdom, continental Europe, Canada, and the United States. Farooq Sobhan points out that there is “widespread acceptance [that the] diaspora can prove to be an extremely valuable asset, both in terms of attracting investment and leveraging their knowledge and expertise.”

However, some trends in Bangladesh seem at odds with expert advice that migration is no substitute for proper development policies. For example, enthusiasm for emigration and remittances has even given rise to arguments that “the most efficient way of developing Bangladesh is to encourage more emigration”. There is a heavy emphasis on “marketing, upskilling, and diversification” of labour export flows to achieve development, and often an assumption that “development is a natural or inevitable outgrowth of more labour migration.”
3. A Plan of Action

This section advances policy recommendations in line with the Commission’s Terms of Reference. These are aimed primarily at national governments, but in many cases have key implications for local and international organizations, and for civil society groups. There are four sets of recommendations: 1) build migration management capacity, 2) streamline migration policies, 3) help migrants to share their successes, and 4) enhance international cooperation over migration. Recommendations 1 and 4 focus on changes of specific relevance to Commonwealth leaders, whereas recommendations 2 and 3 focus on more widely applicable initiatives, through which Commonwealth decision makers should take the lead in implementing international standards and best practices.

Recommendation 1: Build Migration Management Capacity

Effective migration management requires professionally trained officials with access to detailed, accurate and up-to-date migration data and issues, and detailed knowledge of relevant policy instruments. Commonwealth states should train migration officials and improve migration data as detailed below.

1.1 Train Migration Experts and Officials

Although the Commonwealth contains many of the world’s most experienced immigration and emigration countries, many Commonwealth national statistics offices need to develop capacities for data collection, analysis and dissemination. Much could be achieved by systematically sharing best practices among member states. A key first step should be to systematically compare migration management experiences, and conduct an inventory of experts trained in statistical analysis and policy design in Commonwealth countries. The Commonwealth could then partner with high-capacity governments, universities and aid donors to deliver training programmes. By showcasing the expertise embedded within the Commonwealth, such programmes might also garner interest from non-member countries and organizations seeking to improve their migration management systems.

1.2 Improve Migration Data

Despite regular calls for improvements for more than a century, international migration data are still beset by problems with availability and comparability. Data availability is marred by historical and geographical gaps, owing to disruptions such as shifting borders, and inconsistent record keeping – particularly in developing countries. Data on emigration is even scarcer than data on immigration. Comparability problems arise from different national capacities and priorities, in addition to lack of coordination among states and international agencies. Most important is the lack of agreement over the basic definition of key terms, including “migrant”: some countries define migrants as foreign-born people (the preferable option for statisticians), whereas others define them as foreign citizens.

The Commonwealth should set an example by implementing agreed international standards and best practices on the collection of migration data. Five key measures were agreed in May 2008 by a Commission of experts including leading migration scholars and senior migration officials from the United Nations, the World Bank, the OECD, and Eurostat.
1. Ask basic census questions and make the data publicly available.
2. Compile and release existing administrative data.
4. Provide access to microdata, not just tabulations.
5. Include migration modules on more existing household surveys.

**Recommendation 2: Streamline Migration Policies**

Migration policies should seek to enhance individual freedoms without undermining collective welfare. Migration should be regulated to prevent exploitation of migrants, depletion of origin country human resources, and abrupt transformations in destination societies. To this end, Commonwealth leaders – like those of all countries – should simplify regulations around mobility, mitigate brain drain, and manage low skilled labour migration.

**2.1 Simplify Regulations around Mobility**

Migration policies typically come into being through complex political processes, and can evolve ad hoc into regulatory labyrinths, giving scope to rent-seeking recruitment agents. Regulations should be streamlined by simplifying immigration controls, designing coherent emigration policies, and ‘joining up’ migration and development policies.

**2.1.1 Make immigration controls simpler and more transparent**

Simpler and more coherent migration controls are generally more efficient and equitable, and push less migration through irregular channels. Key measures include opening legal low-skill channels into primary production, manufacturing and low skilled service sectors; streamlining recognition of foreign credentials (for example, along the lines of the Commonwealth’s work on teacher mobility), and cutting paperwork. For example, by overhauling its asylum procedures, the Government of Cyprus has been able to drastically reduce backlogs of asylum applications (from 10,420 cases pending at the end of 2005, to just 995 at the end of 2010), addressing concerns about bogus applications providing a backdoor into the labour market.

**2.1.2 Design strategic and coherent emigration policies**

Most countries have various laws and policies affecting their diasporas (see Appendix 2), but few coordinate these in coherent and strategic ways. Diaspora policies are generally incomplete or ad hoc, resulting in gaps and overlaps that lead to bureaucratic inefficiencies and needless injustices. States should design strategic and coherent emigration policies. This involves recognizing emigrants’ positive contributions, cultivating interdepartmental coordination on diaspora-related policies, and bringing external citizenship provisions into line with international standards (including allowing reasonable levels of political participation), strengthening healthcare and pension portability, and taking a fresh look at rules surrounding tax residency and extradition.

**2.1.3 ‘Join up’ migration and development policies**

Migration affects all parts of government and is therefore often the responsibility of none. A critical issue facing migration policy is lack of coherence among a plethora of agencies at the...
local, national and international levels. ‘Whole of government’ approaches are needed in both origin and destination countries, in addition to international consultation and collaboration. In particular, migration should be seen as integral to development rather than separate from it, and relevant bureaucracies should cooperate so as to coherently mainstream migration into development strategies.

2.2 Mitigate “Brain Drain” and Promote “Brain Circulation”

A range of policies have been proposed to mitigate brain drain; some are more feasible and effective than others. Exit controls are illegitimate and cannot prevent brain drain. Two-track education systems, with basic training and ‘world class’ training paths are more feasible, but can be condescending and possibly detrimental over time. Systems where migrants or destination countries compensate origin countries, such as government compensation or the so-called Bhagwati Tax on skilled expatriates, can be unsustainably expensive and unfair to expatriates who did not receive publicly funded education at ‘home’, and they may also discourage migrants from returning or engaging transnationally in productive ways.

“Ethical” recruitment policies, are not always effective at reducing destination-country recruitment of highly skilled workers from developing countries, nor are they straightforwardly more ethical than the alternatives: for example, they are sometimes criticized for institutionalizing workplace discrimination on the basis of nationality. However, destination countries do have a responsibility, both to their own workers and to developing countries, to try and recruit locally before hiring from abroad, and measures such as the Commonwealth’s guidelines for the recruitment of teachers and healthcare workers are widely respected.

A more holistic approach is to address both supply- and demand-side pressures by maintaining adequate domestic training in destination countries, and improving working conditions in key vulnerable sectors origin countries. Stimulating innovation through focused development assistance to vulnerable sectors such as education and healthcare is one option. Using international support to establish healthcare or educational centres of excellence in origin countries can also retain and attract back skilled workers. Another approach is to promote “brain circulation” through “co-investment schemes”, which involve origin and destination countries both investing in the training of “a mobile and global pool of professionals”; for example, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development has invested in the development of the health sector of developing countries including India.

2.3 Manage Low Skilled Labour Migration

Temporary low skilled labour migration can benefit destination countries by filling short-term demand for undesirable jobs. It can benefit migrants by giving them an opportunity to save money by working abroad. And origin countries can benefit through financial and social remittances. However, the “guest worker” programmes of previous eras have been widely criticized for failing to either return migrants to their origin countries or to facilitate their integration into societies of destination. While recognizing the potential of temporary migration schemes, these pitfalls should be avoided through precautions and protections.
2.3.1 Expand regular channels for low skilled migration

In developed economies with aging populations, key sectors, such as agriculture and domestic care, now depend on migrant labour. Restricting migration does not eliminate demand, but rather drives it through informal channels, allowing employers and agents to undercut destination country labour standards by exploiting irregular migrants, who are also less able to contribute to their countries of origin. Restricting labour migration is therefore a “’lose-lose’ strategy that may harm both receiving and sending countries”. Everyone gains by allowing labour migration to flow through regulated channels.

2.3.2 Uphold migrants’ rights and labour standards

Upholding labour standards in destination countries protects both migrants and native workers from exploitation, and reduces inter-ethnic competition. Origin and destination governments should cooperate with civil society to ensure that migrants are adequately informed of rights and conditions before departing. They should cooperate to regulate employers, migrants and – in particular – recruitment agencies. Employer sanctions must be easier to implement, and there must be real high-level political commitment to making them work. Migrants should be allowed to switch jobs after a certain period, in order to reduce the power of employers to impose substandard working conditions. Recalcitrant countries and employers could be internationally “blacklisted”. International organizations such as the International Labour Organization have run training courses on “extending social protection to migrant workers and their families”, and this model could be of interest to the Commonwealth.

2.3.3 Incentivize return

Past experience demonstrates that excluding “guest workers” from citizenship not only created social problems but also failed to prevent unintended large-scale settlement. Temporary labour migration programmes should learn from this experience and include fair and robust measures to incentivize return. Lump sum compensations, compulsory savings and tax rebates have been criticized for both failing to promote return and abusing migrants’ rights. Instead, return can be facilitated by ensuring migrants can stay long enough and earn enough to meet savings targets: employers must honour salary promises, and middlemen should be prevented from levying extortionate fees. Multiple-re-entry visas can remove migrants’ desire to stay beyond employment for fear of not being allowed back in later.

Recommendation 3: Help Migrants to Share Their Successes

Through remittances and transnational engagements, migrants can share their successes with their origin and destination countries and help turn migration into a win for all involved. But these contributions cannot replace proper development strategies; policymakers can help to maximize gains from migration, but migration is not in itself a development panacea. Diaspora initiatives cannot succeed without decent political, economic and social conditions, and policy makers should avoid unduly pressuring migrants emotionally and financially. Nevertheless, Commonwealth decision makers should help migrants to share their successes by facilitating remittances and engaging diasporas.
3.1 Facilitate Remittances

Expert opinions converge around three main recommendations concerning remittances: do not interfere with private funds; expand remittance infrastructure so as to increase speed, reduce costs and improve access; and encourage bottom-up initiatives to attract funds into developmental investments.

3.1.1 Refrain from interfering with migrants’ money

Remittances are not public property but private transfers among family and friends. State interference is liable to push remittances through informal channels, where they may be used for illicit purposes, so policies should aim to make formal channels more attractive by removing constraints and fostering competition rather than directly intervening.

3.1.2 Reduce remittance costs

Recognizing the remittance industry as distinct from the banking sector can help to foster competition. Rules around transfers should be harmonized, especially in remittance-sending countries. Technologies for receiving remittances should be improved and expanded, for example by improving existing infrastructures such as credit unions, microfinance institutions, post offices and mobile phone networks. Information about fees and exchange rates should be made more accessible to migrants.

Such recommendations have been echoed and pursued widely, with considerable recent success. Efforts to reduce remittance transfer costs “are bearing fruit. Average remittance transfer costs to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have dropped by about 75 per cent since 2000 and the global costs of transferring remittances declined from 9.8 per cent in September 2008 to 8.7 per cent in early 2010.” Nevertheless, transfer costs remain high in several corridors, particularly South-South flows which are often routed through other developing countries, incurring additional fees.

3.1.3 Encourage bottom-up philanthropic initiatives

Diaspora groups such as Home Town Associations should be considered central to encouraging collective remittances for philanthropic purposes. With their local knowledge and commitments, they can make valuable collaborators in conceiving and implementing remittance-backed development initiatives. Well-known examples include matched funding programmes modelled on Mexico’s “Tres Per Uno”, in which state and federal governments match migrants’ funds dollar for dollar. Care should be taken not to manhandle remittances into collective vehicles, which are vulnerable to poor governance and graft. Diaspora-led initiatives depend on support from local organizations and institutions in the origin country, and they should therefore be recognized and consulted from the outset.

3.2 Engage Diasporas

Emigrants often invest, establish businesses, contribute skills and make charitable donations to their home countries. Such behaviour is influenced by factors including restrictive immigration policies, distance from home and barriers to integration in destination societies. Conflict, corruption, excessive bureaucracy or failure to uphold emigrants’ rights in the origin country can also discourage migrants from investing and contributing
Conversely, policy makers and civil society groups can facilitate engagement by cultivating positive diaspora attachments, as well as encouraging and enabling contributions.

### 3.2.1 Enable positive, stable diaspora attachments

Policy makers must recognize how “social remittances” are transforming identities and institutions in origin countries; they should adapt to benign transformations, while discouraging negative ones such as the spread of criminal or extremist networks.

First, policy makers need to boost their own capacities to engage with diaspora communities, building knowledge and skills in policy areas with a diaspora dimension, and improving overall coherence among different policy agencies. Development departments and international organizations should make their work transparent and accessible, for example through online information and targeted workshops, such as those proposed by the Royal Africa Society and numerous other groups. Aid agencies could also improve recruitment policies to better represent diversity.

Second, policy makers and civil society groups can help to build the capacity of diaspora organizations. In order to engage and support diaspora organizations, policy makers need to ‘know’ them better; better data, consular and diplomatic outreach, more frequent visits from home-country decision-makers, along with conferences and consultative forums are key areas for improvement in many countries. Partnerships involving financial and technical assistance to credible groups, such as chambers of commerce, are key. Decision makers must also commit at a high-level and be prepared to invest time and resources into meaningful relationships with diaspora groups.

An increasingly popular approach is to support the establishment of online networks and databases of skilled expatriates, in parallel with online information about investment, volunteering and employment openings, and projects such as fairs for recruitment, trade and investment, mentoring schemes, and conferences. Destination countries and consulates can assist with migrants’ access to information and communication technologies to improve the impact of such initiatives.

### 3.2.2 Encourage diaspora investments and contributions

Nothing can substitute for a welcoming investment environment when it comes to facilitating diaspora contributions. Keeping inflation and exchange rates in check, limiting bureaucratic red tape, and maintaining infrastructure are all crucial in this respect. Light touch incentives such as bolstering consular and trade representation, and expanding expatriates’ access to information about opportunities, may encourage migrants to invest time and resources in their homelands. Relatively minor issues surrounding poorly managed external citizenship provisions can balloon into major and unnecessary irritants in state-diaspora relations, and therefore origin states should take gripes on such issues seriously.

Aid organizations and civil society groups can facilitate volunteering programmes, or encourage temporary work visits and long-distance “virtual” collaborations. The United Nations TOKTEN Program is one oft-cited example; another is the International Organization for Migration’s MIDA programme. However, policy makers should be aware that programmes predicated on return have often been unsuccessful, and have also
raised concerns about the motives of governments. It should be remembered that not all return is necessarily positive or conducive to “brain gain”.

**Recommendation 4: Enhance International Cooperation over Migration**

Migration is both a domestic and an international issue, and therefore it can neither be addressed by policies based solely on narrow national self-interests, nor by delegation of domestic authority to centralized multilateral decision-making. Instead, global migration governance requires consultation and collaboration among communities and countries that are directly linked by migration flows and are therefore able to engage in mutually self-interested cooperation.

Because the Commonwealth is and always has been closely linked not only by values but also by population exchanges, Commonwealth decision makers should cooperate more closely to protect migrants’ rights and negotiate towards coherent ways of managing migration. Establishing a Commonwealth Consultative Process on migration would help considerably in this regard. The Commonwealth should also share its wealth of migration management experience by playing a more active role in wider global migration governance processes.

**4.1 Cooperate to Protect Migrants’ Rights**

Multilateral agreements and conventions on migrants’ rights have low ratification rates and even lower implementation rates. For example, just 10 Commonwealth states have signed up to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. More and better international cooperation is necessary to provide more seamless protection of the basic rights of people who cross borders. This requires ‘responsibility sharing’ at the national level, as well as the development of a more comprehensive framework for protection of vulnerable migrants at the international level.

**4.1.1 Share responsibility for migrants’ rights**

In principle, migrants have inalienable human rights; in practice, their rights derive from national citizenships to which many migrants lack full access (and to which some have dual entitlements). As well as working to improve ratification rates of international human rights instruments, and strengthening the “soft-law” framework surrounding vulnerable groups that fall outside the 1951 Refugee Convention, policy makers and civil society groups in destination and origin countries should share the responsibility of avoiding gaps and overlaps in migrant protection frameworks. Key measures include support for voluntary sector integration initiatives in destination countries, more robust external citizenship provisions in origin countries, and improvement of bilateral and multilateral frameworks covering the portability of social security entitlements.

Destination countries should link issues of migrants’ rights and integration to wider family and welfare policies. States and international organizations should see civil society groups as “strategic partners” in promoting the integration of new migrants, as they can often move more quickly and flexibly than state agencies to provide support. Meanwhile, origin countries should uphold migrants’ rights at home and contribute to their integration in the
destination country through proper “external citizenship” provisions around expatriate voting, pension portability, and consular service.

Bilateral agreements help states to resolve gaps and overlaps in social security provision resulting from migration, but they currently only cover about 25% of all migrants, and represent an extremely complex and inefficient area of international law. Governments should expand and standardize their networks of portability agreements. The Commonwealth may want to consider encouraging standardization around agreement templates from, or similar to those from, international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Union.

4.2 Establish a Commonwealth Consultative Process

Because much international migration occurs among geographically and culturally proximate countries, regional consultative processes are emerging as key mechanisms for international cooperation over migration. Although the Commonwealth is geographically dispersed, it retains many characteristics of a unitary migration system. As demonstrated throughout this report, Commonwealth flows not only account for a major portion of movement to and from Commonwealth countries, but also represent a substantial portion of all international migration.

The Commonwealth is one of several worldwide language groupings whose role in global governance has arguably been somewhat overlooked. The establishment of a Commonwealth Consultative Process – taking the form of a regular series of semi-formal conferences bringing together appropriate levels of migration policy makers and officials – could significantly assist with international cooperation over migration, and underpin many of the other recommendations made in this section and elsewhere in this report.

4.3 Boost Commonwealth Participation in Global Migration Governance Forums

Because of its historical and continuing role as an arena for international migration, the Commonwealth has unique expertise that could benefit wider discussions about migration management at the national and international levels. The Commonwealth should play a more active role in global migration governance than it currently does. The Commonwealth Heads of Government should direct the Commonwealth Secretariat to ensure that the organization is properly represented at major global forums on migration, such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the United Nations General Assembly’s High Level Dialogues on Migration and Development, and various relevant regional consultative processes on migration. Boosting the Commonwealth’s profile at these forums could be achieved by engaging migration experts and officials from member countries in a representative capacity, and would require only a small increase in funding and relevant expertise within the Secretariat itself.
4. Conclusion

The Commonwealth remains one of the world’s great migration arenas. Commonwealth migrants not only account for a significant proportion of migration to and from Commonwealth countries, but also for a large fraction of all international migration. Moreover, the Commonwealth contains many of the world’s classic origin and destination societies, and it exemplifies many crucial issues connected with managing migration for development. Migration is therefore both an important internal issue for the Commonwealth, and an issue where the Commonwealth can make a significant contribution to wider global governance. In an era when its relevance is increasingly questioned, the Commonwealth should “re-connect” over the issue of migration.

Managing migration can increase its developmental advantages for migrants as well as for origin and destination countries. Migrants can gain through freedom of movement as well as improved welfare for themselves and their families. Destination countries can gain economically, culturally, socially and politically through the energy and ideas of immigrants. And origin countries can also gain as migrants share their successes with those who remain behind. Yet if unmanaged, migration can become a divisive and destructive force in societies: it can uproot people and increase their vulnerability, it can deplete origin societies, and it can drive a wedge into destination communities. Maximizing the gains and minimizing the costs of migration entails getting the policies right.

This report has made four sets of recommendations: 1) build migration management capacity, 2) streamline migration policies, 3) help migrants to share their successes, and 4) improve international cooperation over migration.

Building migration management capacity entails understanding and improving the training procedures for migration experts and officials in Commonwealth countries, and improving the availability and comparability of international migration data.

Streamlining migration policies involves increasing the freedoms of individual migrants, but not at the expense of collective welfare in origin and destination countries. Regulations surrounding mobility should be made simpler and more transparent, the management of emigration should be improved, and migration and development policies should be ‘joined up’ across all levels, so that migration is treated as an integral element of development, rather than something external to it. Brain drain should be mitigated by improving training in destination countries, and improving working conditions for key skilled professionals in origin countries. Brain circulation should be encouraged through co-investment schemes. And low skilled labour migration should be allowed through legal channels, but managed so as to protect the rights and welfare of migrant workers and uphold labour standards in destination countries.

Helping migrants to share their successes with their origin and destination countries should not involve heavy-handed attempts to divert migrants’ energy and resources into public projects. Rather, it should involve facilitating their remittances by building infrastructure and supporting bottom up initiatives, as well as encouraging and enabling diasporas to invest at home, do business with homeland firms, and share their skills and networks with people in their home countries.
Improving international cooperation over migration involves cooperating to protect migrants’ human rights, including by sharing the responsibility of upholding citizenship entitlements. In order to improve internal Commonwealth cooperation, and also contribute to wider international cooperation, the Commonwealth should establish a Commonwealth Consultative Process, modelled on the many regional consultative processes that exist in this area. It should also foster a more distinctive Commonwealth voice in existing global migration governance forums, where Commonwealth experiences and expertise have much to offer to wider discussions.

Finally, despite its ongoing importance, the Commonwealth migration system is generally under researched. In particular, there is a need for more Commonwealth-specific research on the relationships between migration and development. Such research should focus on understanding the local, national and global conditions under which various kinds of migration are and are not conducive to development. Understanding and evaluating the role of policy in creating these conditions is an especially important task. Better understanding of the modern Commonwealth migration system would help to improve migration management among member states and beyond. It would also galvanize the energy and expertise of Commonwealth around one of its defining features, and help to demonstrate the organization’s ongoing relevance. In short, taking a fresh look at migration could help to “re-connect” the Commonwealth.
Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

The Terms of Reference of the Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development are listed below. Terms of Reference covered by this report are boldfaced.

1. The Commission will examine the human dimensions of migration, and make appropriate recommendations to improve the development advantage, and diminish any disadvantage.
2. In particular the Commission will consider brain drain, brain waste and brain circulation and, having regard to the need for pro-poor development, will consider the situation of unskilled migrants, gender issues, and the scope for improving training in destination countries.
3. The Commission will consider the potential for a set of principles governing migration policy within the Commonwealth, recognising that migration policy is a matter for states and that citizens have a right to migrate; such principles may be designed to protect the rights of migrants, and to promote ethical recruitment.
4. Building on the recent “Respect and Understanding” report by the Commonwealth, the Commission will recommend ways in which governments may challenge xenophobia in their countries, promote understanding of the causes and benefits of migration, and act to prevent perceptions of unfairness in poor host communities. It will seek “win-win” solutions.
5. The Commission will pay particular attention to problems arising from environmentally-induced migration, both for environmentally-fragile states and their neighbours, and advise the Commonwealth how these may be mitigated, and the threatened communities assisted.
6. The Commission will recommend how diasporas, and traditional connections between Commonwealth states, may provide greater benefit for the development of member states.
7. In particular the Commission will consider how transaction costs in remittance flows between families may be reduced, how community-based and sector-specific organisations may be encouraged, and how a positive relationship between migration, development and the trade in goods and services may be stimulated by governments and the private sector.
8. The Commission will make specific recommendations to assist small states and less developed countries (LDCs) which have suffered excessive out-migration of expensively trained persons, and have yet to benefit significantly from return migration or diasporic investment.
9. The Commission will, where appropriate, recommend particular Commonwealth strategies or programmes of either a multilateral or bilateral kind – for instance protocols or codes of the kind devised for school teachers and health workers, or programmes of targeted managed migration such as are current between some Caribbean countries and the US and Canada, and between South Pacific islands and Australia and New Zealand.
10. The Commission will present a vision statement for migration policy within the Commonwealth for the next decade, which may influence policy at the global level also.
## Appendix 2: Commonwealth Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income Group(^a)</th>
<th>Human Development Index(^b)</th>
<th>Total Population in 2007 (millions)(^b)</th>
<th>Emigrants to Commonwealth as % of total(^c)</th>
<th>Immigrants from Commonwealth as % of total(^c)</th>
<th>Effect of emigration on proportion of skilled(^c)</th>
<th>Remittances as % of GDP in 2008(^d)</th>
<th>Allows Dual Citizenship(^h)</th>
<th>External Voting(^g)</th>
<th>Diaspora Institution(^i)</th>
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<td>Usually</td>
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<td>147.7</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Lower Mid.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>173.2</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>By treaty</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Income Level</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pap. New Gin.</td>
<td>Lower Mid.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>Lower Mid.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>-7.4%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>Upper Mid.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>-5.3%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Is.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Upper Mid.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Usually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Lower Mid.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Usually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Kitts &amp; Nev.</td>
<td>Upper Mid.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-16.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Lucia</td>
<td>Upper Mid.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>-7.1%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Vin. &amp; Gre.</td>
<td>Upper Mid.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>-14.0%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Lower Mid.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>Lower Mid.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>-8.3%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trin. &amp; Tob.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>-11.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Usually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>Lower Mid.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>High OECD</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Usually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Lower Mid.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
.. Indicates missing data
*Indicated ranking is for Micronesia, Fed. Sts

Data sources:
1 World Bank Country and Lending Groups
7 Data and classifications from Collyer and Vathi (2007) ‘Patterns of Extra-territorial Voting’, Working Paper T22, Sussex Centre for Migration Research. 1=Vote in home district. Expatriates have to travel to their country of origin in order to vote. 2=Vote abroad for home district. Expatriates can vote in polling stations abroad but the votes are counted as if they were resident in an electoral district within their country of origin. 3=Vote abroad for direct representation. Expatriates elect their own representation in legislative elections. 4=Expatriates are not allowed to vote, although elections are held in the country. 5=No elections are held.
8 Various online.
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———. 2008c. "Why Is It Important to Know About Diasporas?" In *United Nations Economic and Social Council Conference of European Statisticians*. OECD.


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Wilson, M. 2001. "The Concerns and Issues of a Generation Lost Beyond the Brain Drain." Results of an online survey by the University of Auckland Business School, 24 July.


Endnotes


3 Hovy, B. 2010. International Migration and Development in the Commonwealth of Nations: An Overview. London: The Ramphal Centre. Page 2. This figure is based on the United Nations Population Division definition of the "International Migrant Stock": "The mid-year (1 July) estimate of the number of people living in a country or area other than that in which they were born. If the number of foreign-born was not available, the estimate refers to the number of people living in a country other than that of their citizenship." Ibid. Annex I notes.

4 All figures in this paragraph are from: IOM Facts & Figures, [http://www.iom.int/jahia/jahia/pid/241](http://www.iom.int/jahia/jahia/pid/241).


32 Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS), [http://www.ucas.ac.uk/about_us/stat_services/stats_online/data_tables/deferring](http://www.ucas.ac.uk/about_us/stat_services/stats_online/data_tables/deferring) (accessed 26 October 2010). I am grateful to Alisdair Ambrozik for initiating this line of inquiry and locating data.


Emigration rates ranged between 40% and 70% in Barbados, Gambia, Guyana, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mozambique, Trinidad and Tobago. They were at 5% in Australia, Bangladesh, Botswana, Canada, India, Lesotho and Swaziland Hovy, B. 2010. International Migration and Development in the Commonwealth of Nations: An Overview. London: The Ramphal Centre. Page 4.

They still come?" The Economist 396 (8694):23.


http://www.guardian.co.uk/flash/0,5860,1398066,00.html


I am grateful to Richard Bourne for prompting this line of enquiry and providing useful information.


Three of the 27 EU member states are in the Commonwealth: the United Kingdom, Cyprus, and Malta.

The Trans-Tasman Free Travel Arrangement covers movement between New Zealand and Australia.


I am grateful to Brenda Yeoh for sharing her expert insights on this point.


I am grateful to Richard Bourne for prompting this line of enquiry and providing useful information.

Four of the twelve ECOWAS member states are also in the Commonwealth: The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Four of the five EAC member states are also in the Commonwealth: Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.


Three of the 27 EU member states are in the Commonwealth: the United Kingdom, Cyprus, and Malta.

The Trans-Tasman Free Travel Arrangement covers movement between New Zealand and Australia.

The figures 52% and 49% are derived from analysis of the Commonwealth proportion of migrant stocks in Migration DRC (2007), Global Migrant Origin Database, Version 4. This database compiles foreign-born and foreign nationals captured in all available national censuses from the 2000 round, disaggregated by origin country where possible, and compiled and supplemented by estimates. For a full explication of the database, see Parsons, C. R., R. Skeldon, T. L. Walmsley, and L. A. Winters. 2007. "Quantifying International Migration: A Database of Bilateral Migrant Stocks." World Bank Policy, Research working paper no. WPS 4165.


E.g. see ibid. Page 15.


136 ibid Page 2. I am grateful to Richard Bourne for suggesting this line of inquiry.


188 I am grateful to Brenda Yeoh for her insights on this point.
190 I am indebted to Aurelia Wa Kabwe-Segatti and Robin Cohen for their expert comments on earlier drafts of this case study.
199 I am indebted to Aurelia Wa Kabwe-Segatti and Robin Cohen for their insightful pointers on this topic.
203 I am grateful to Robin Cohen for his insightful pointers on this topic.
210 I am indebted to Aurelia Wa Kabwe-Segatti for sharing her insights on this point.


Interview with the author, Wellington, March 2007.


The Brain Drain and Taxation: Theory and Empirical Analysis

Exploring Contemporary Migration

Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development - Human Development Report 2009


Martin's comments refer to the Asian region more generally, but it seems particularly apt in the case of Bangladesh.

The Commission on International Migration Data for Development Research and Policy brought together leading experts on migration data from the United Nations Population Division; the World Bank; the International Organization for Migration; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); Eurostat; the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Princeton University; and the Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); Eurostat; the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Princeton University; and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).


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Commission on Migration and Development
Meeting of the Commission

Paphos, Cyprus 30-31 October 2010

The Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development was set up in 2009 to study relevant issues of particular interest to the Commonwealth, and to propose practical policies which are mutually beneficial to all 54 Commonwealth member states.